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The figure of Prophet Ibrāhīm (Abraham) occupies a central place in the religious imagination of both Christianity and Islam. His willingness to surrender everything for the sake of God has inspired theologians, philosophers, and mystics across centuries. Among modern thinkers, Søren Kierkegaard presents Abraham as the supreme exemplar of faith in Fear and Trembling, while Islamic Sufism regards him as a model of complete submission and spiritual transformation. This article explores the relationship between Kierkegaard's concept of the Double Movement of Infinity and the Sufi concepts of fanāʾ (annihilation of the ego) and baqāʾ (abiding in God). Through a comparative analysis of Abraham's role in both traditions, the study argues that significant structural similarities exist between Kierkegaardian faith and Sufi spirituality. Both emphasize radical surrender, inward transformation, and the transcendence of ordinary selfhood. Nevertheless, important differences remain. While Kierkegaard locates faith in the paradoxical relationship between the individual and God beyond universal ethical categories, Sufism ultimately integrates spiritual realization within the framework of Sharīʿah and prophetic guidance. The comparison reveals a shared existential grammar of surrender while highlighting distinct theological and metaphysical horizons.

Introduction

The search for meaning has accompanied humanity throughout its history. Human beings continuously seek answers concerning existence, suffering, purpose, and their relationship with the divine. While philosophical traditions often approach these questions through reason and conceptual analysis, religious traditions frequently emphasize faith, surrender, and spiritual transformation.

Within the Abrahamic traditions, few figures embody these themes more profoundly than Prophet Ibrāhīm (Abraham). His life represents unwavering trust in God amidst uncertainty, sacrifice, and trial. The Qurʾān portrays him as an exemplary believer who submitted entirely to the divine will, earning the title of Khalīl Allāh (Friend of God). Likewise, Christian thinkers have long regarded Abraham as a model of faith.

Among modern philosophers, Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855) offers one of the most influential interpretations of Abraham. Writing against the dominance of abstract philosophical systems, Kierkegaard shifted attention from speculative thought to lived religious existence. In Fear and Trembling, Abraham becomes the embodiment of authentic faith, a faith that transcends ordinary ethical calculations and rests solely upon trust in God.¹

Within Islamic intellectual history, Sufism developed an equally profound account of spiritual transformation. Central to this tradition are the concepts of fanāʾ and baqāʾ, which describe the annihilation of egoistic selfhood and the subsequent abiding in divine consciousness. Classical Sufi thinkers frequently viewed Abraham's trials as symbols of the seeker's journey toward God.²

This article argues that Kierkegaard's Double Movement of Infinity and the Sufi concepts of fanāʾ and baqāʾ exhibit striking structural similarities. Both describe a process of surrender, renunciation, and spiritual renewal. Yet these similarities coexist with important theological differences concerning faith, ethics, and the nature of the relationship between God and humanity.

From Epistemology to Existence: Kierkegaard's Philosophical Revolution

Modern Western philosophy was largely preoccupied with questions of knowledge. From René Descartes onward, philosophers sought certainty through rational foundations. Rationalists emphasized the authority of reason, while empiricists grounded knowledge in experience. This intellectual project reached its most sophisticated form in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant.

The nineteenth century, however, witnessed growing dissatisfaction with purely epistemological concerns. The question increasingly shifted from "How do we know?" to "How should we live?"

Kierkegaard emerged within this context as a critic of the dominant philosophical system of G. W. F. Hegel. Hegel's philosophy sought to explain reality through a comprehensive dialectical system in which all contradictions were ultimately reconciled. Kierkegaard regarded such systems as incapable of accounting for the concrete reality of human existence.

For Kierkegaard, existence cannot be reduced to concepts. Human beings do not merely think; they choose, suffer, fear, hope, and believe. The deepest questions of life are not solved through logical demonstration but through personal commitment. Truth, therefore, becomes existential rather than merely theoretical. What matters is not only whether a proposition is true but how one exists in relation to that truth.

This emphasis on lived experience transformed the direction of modern philosophy and laid important foundations for later existentialist thought.

Either/Or and the Stages of Human Existence

Kierkegaard's analysis of human existence is most clearly presented in Either/Or. Here he describes three stages through which individuals may relate to life: the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious.³

The aesthetic stage is characterized by the pursuit of pleasure, enjoyment, and immediate satisfaction. The individual seeks happiness through experiences and desires. Yet such a life ultimately leads to boredom and despair because it lacks permanence and ultimate meaning.

The ethical stage represents a higher mode of existence. Here the individual embraces responsibility, commitment, and moral duty. Life acquires coherence through adherence to ethical principles and social obligations.

Despite its importance, the ethical stage remains insufficient. Human existence involves dimensions that transcend universal moral categories. The deepest religious experiences cannot always be explained through ethical reasoning alone.

The religious stage therefore constitutes the highest form of existence. At this stage, the individual stands directly before God in complete dependence and trust. Faith becomes a personal and existential relationship rather than a mere acceptance of doctrines.

This understanding reaches its fullest expression in Kierkegaard's interpretation of Abraham.

Abraham and the Paradox of Faith

In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard presents Abraham as the "Knight of Faith." The command to sacrifice his son places Abraham in a situation that appears ethically incomprehensible. Any ordinary moral framework would condemn such an act. Yet Abraham remains obedient because his relationship with God transcends universal ethical categories.⁴

Kierkegaard describes this phenomenon as the "teleological suspension of the ethical." The ethical is not rejected; rather, it is temporarily suspended in obedience to a higher divine purpose.

Abraham's experience is characterized by profound tension. He simultaneously accepts God's command and trusts God's promise. He believes that he must sacrifice Isaac while also believing that God will somehow preserve what has been surrendered.

This paradox generates what Kierkegaard famously calls "fear and trembling." Faith is not certainty in the ordinary sense. It involves risk, vulnerability, and complete trust in God despite the apparent impossibility of understanding His purposes.

For Kierkegaard, Abraham becomes the ultimate example of religious existence because he demonstrates absolute dependence upon God.

Abraham in the Qurʾān and Sufi Spirituality

The Qurʾān portrays Prophet Ibrāhīm as one of the greatest exemplars of faith and submission. His willingness to sacrifice his son appears in Sūrat al-Ṣāffāt (37:102–107), where both father and son submit themselves to the divine command. Unlike Kierkegaard's emphasis on paradox, the Qurʾānic narrative highlights obedience, trust, and divine mercy.

Another significant episode appears in Sūrat al-Baqarah (2:260), where Ibrāhīm asks God to show him how the dead are resurrected. When asked whether he believes, Ibrāhīm responds affirmatively but seeks reassurance for his heart. This passage illustrates the dynamic relationship between faith and spiritual certainty within Islamic thought.

Sufi thinkers interpreted Abraham's experiences not merely as historical events but as symbols of the spiritual journey. The sacrifice represents the seeker's willingness to surrender every attachment that competes with devotion to God.

Al-Qushayrī, al-Ghazālī, and later Ibn ʿArabī all emphasize that the path to God requires purification of the self and liberation from egoistic desires.⁵ The spiritual traveller must relinquish attachment to worldly identities and ambitions in order to attain genuine proximity to God.

Among these thinkers, Ibn ʿArabī offers one of the most profound interpretations of Abraham. He regards the sacrifice as a symbol of inward transformation. What is ultimately sacrificed is not merely an external object but the ego itself—the illusion of autonomous selfhood that separates the servant from God.⁶

The Double Movement of Infinity and the Sufi Concepts of Fanāʾ and Baqāʾ

Kierkegaard's account of faith involves what he calls the Double Movement of Infinity.

The first movement is Infinite Resignation. The individual relinquishes attachment to finite realities and accepts loss for the sake of a higher commitment. Abraham demonstrates this movement when he becomes willing to sacrifice what he loves most.

The second movement is the Leap of Faith. Having surrendered everything, the individual nevertheless believes that God can restore what has been given up. Faith therefore involves both renunciation and hope.

This structure bears a remarkable resemblance to the Sufi concepts of fanāʾ and baqāʾ.

Fanāʾ refers to the annihilation of the ego. It does not imply physical destruction or ontological extinction. Rather, it signifies the dissolution of self-centredness, pride, and attachment. The seeker abandons the illusion of independence and recognizes complete dependence upon God.⁷

Baqāʾ follows fanāʾ. Having surrendered the ego, the seeker returns to the world transformed through awareness of God. The self remains, but it is now oriented toward divine reality rather than personal desire.

The parallels are striking. Infinite Resignation resembles fanāʾ because both involve radical renunciation. The Leap of Faith resembles baqāʾ because both involve a renewed relationship with reality grounded in trust and divine presence.

In both traditions, spiritual transformation requires losing oneself in order to discover a deeper form of existence.

Similarities and Differences

The comparison between Kierkegaard and Sufism reveals significant common ground.

Both traditions emphasise inwardness over mere external conformity. Both regard faith as a transformative encounter rather than an abstract doctrine. Both insist that genuine spirituality requires surrender, sacrifice, and trust in God.

Furthermore, both recognise Abraham as the paradigmatic figure of faith. His willingness to sacrifice what is most precious symbolises the transcendence of ordinary selfhood and complete devotion to God.

Nevertheless, important differences remain.

Kierkegaard's account centres upon the solitary individual standing before God. The paradox of faith may place the believer beyond universal ethical norms. This creates a unique tension between religion and ethics.

Sufism, by contrast, never abandons the framework of Sharīʿah. Spiritual realization deepens ethical commitment rather than suspending it. The Sufi path culminates not in isolation from religious law but in its fuller embodiment.

A second difference concerns metaphysics. Kierkegaard focuses primarily on subjective existence and personal faith. Sufi thinkers often situate spiritual transformation within broader metaphysical accounts of reality, creation, and divine manifestation.

Thus, while both traditions share a grammar of surrender, they remain rooted in distinct theological worlds.

Conclusion

The comparison between Kierkegaard and Sufism demonstrates the enduring significance of Abraham as a model of faith and spiritual transformation. Kierkegaard's Double Movement of Infinity and the Sufi concepts of fanāʾ and baqāʾ both describe a journey of renunciation followed by renewal. Each tradition recognizes that genuine faith requires surrendering attachment to the finite in order to attain a deeper relationship with God.

At the same time, the comparison reveals important differences. Kierkegaard's existential Christianity emphasizes paradox and the individual's direct encounter with God beyond ordinary ethical reasoning. Sufism, while deeply concerned with inward transformation, ultimately integrates spiritual realization within the framework of Sharīʿah and prophetic guidance.

These similarities and differences enrich contemporary discussions concerning faith, subjectivity, and religious experience. By placing Kierkegaard and Sufism in dialogue, we gain a deeper appreciation of how diverse religious traditions address the universal human quest for meaning, surrender, and transcendence.

About the author

Muhammed Najil K. K. studies at Darul Uloom Islamic Daʿwah College, Thootha, affiliated with Darul Huda Islamic University, Kerala, India. His academic interests include Islamic thought, Sufism, contemporary philosophy, post-secular studies, and the relationship between religion and modern intellectual traditions.

Endnotes

1. Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, trans. Alastair Hannay (London: Penguin Books, 1985), pp. 53–70.
2. William C. Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-ʿArabī's Metaphysics of Imagination (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), pp. 79–98.
3. Søren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 475–590.
4. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, pp. 83–95.
5. Abū al-Qāsim al-Qushayrī, Al-Risālah al-Qushayriyyah, trans. Alexander D. Knysh (Reading: Garnet Publishing, 2007), pp. 95–110; Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, Iḥyāʾ ʿUlūm al-Dīn, Kitāb Riyāḍat al-Nafs.
6. Michel Chodkiewicz, An Ocean Without Shore: Ibn ʿArabī, the Book, and the Law (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), pp. 21–42.
7. William C. Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, pp. 311–330.

References

Chittick, William C. The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-ʿArabī's Metaphysics of Imagination. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989.

Chodkiewicz, Michel. An Ocean Without Shore: Ibn ʿArabī, the Book, and the Law. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993.

Al-Ghazālī, Abū Ḥāmid. Iḥyāʾ ʿUlūm al-Dīn.

Kierkegaard, Søren. Either/Or. Translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987.

Kierkegaard, Søren. Fear and Trembling. Translated by Alastair Hannay. London: Penguin Books, 1985.

Al-Qushayrī, Abū al-Qāsim. Al-Risālah al-Qushayriyyah. Translated by Alexander D. Knysh. Reading: Garnet Publishing, 2007.