The Emergence of the Science of Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah in the Khurāsānī School

Sharīʿah

The Emergence of the Science of Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah in the Khurāsānī School

The Emergence of the Science of Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah in the Khurāsānī School

This article is the third part of The Emergence of Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah in the Khurāsānī Shāfiʿī School. To read the first and second parts, please visit below links:

The Emergence of Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah in the Khurāsānī Shāfiʿī School (Part 1)

The Scholarly Methodology of the Khurāsānī Shāfiʿī School

The Influence of Imām al-Shāfiʿī’s Uṣūl on the Emergence of Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah

First: The Recognised Evidences According to Imām al-Shāfiʿī

Imām al-Shāfiʿī states:

“Knowledge is of different levels:
The first is the Quran and the Sunnah, when the Sunnah is established.
The second is consensus (ijmāʿ) on matters where there is no Quran or Sunnah.
The third is the statement of a Companion of the Prophet ﷺ, when no opposition among them is known.
The fourth is the disagreement among the Companions.
The fifth is analogy (qiyās) upon some of these categories.”[1]

As for al-Shāfiʿī’s position on istiḥsān (juristic preference), he rejected it and considered it a departure from recognised evidence. He states:

“If abandoning qiyās were permitted, then those of intellect—even without knowledge—could speak on matters lacking textual evidence based on whatever appears to them as preferable (istiḥsān).”[2]

Later scholars of the madhhab, such as al-Ghazālī and other uṣūlīs, attempted to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable forms of istiḥsān.

Although Imām al-Shāfiʿī closed the door to istiḥsān in his madhhab, he did not explicitly state a clear position regarding al-maṣāliḥ al-mursalah. Reports from Shāfiʿī scholars differ on this matter[3]. However, they agree on his acceptance of maṣāliḥ muʿtabarah—interests that are grounded in a recognised Sharʿī principle, as will be discussed.

Second: Consideration of the Universal Principles of Sharīʿah and Its General Interests

Imām al-Ḥaramayn, when discussing al-Shāfiʿī’s methodological approach, states:

“He (al-Shāfiʿī) exercised excellent judgement in structuring legal branches upon two great foundations: first, prioritising universal principles over particular analogies. For this reason, he ruled that killing with a heavy object entails legal retribution, out of fear that otherwise it may become a means to the unlawful shedding of blood.”[4]

This indicates that Imām al-Shāfiʿī considered public interests when they were rooted in universal Sharʿī principles. Al-Zanjānī states:

“Al-Shāfiʿī held that reliance upon interests grounded in the general principles of the Sharīʿah—even if not tied to specific textual particulars—is permissible.”[5]

Al-Samʿānī similarly notes:

“What is indicated by the madhhab of al-Shāfiʿī—may Allah have mercy on him—is that istidlāl (juristic inference) is authoritative, even if it is not directly based on a specific precedent, provided that it remains close to the recognised meanings and principles established in the Sharīʿah.”[6]

Al-Ghazālī also transmits from Imām al-Shāfiʿī regarding the ordering of evidence for a mujtahid:

“When a case is presented to him, he should first refer it to the explicit texts of the Qur’an. If not found there, then to the mutawātir Sunnah; if not, then to solitary reports (āḥād). If none are found, he should not immediately resort to qiyās, but instead examine the apparent meanings of the Qur’an. If a general meaning is found, he should consider whether there are specifications from qiyās or reports. If none are found, he rules by it. If no text from the Qur’an or Sunnah is found, he looks to the established madhāhib; if there is consensus, he follows it. If not, he engages in qiyās—while first considering the universal principles and giving them precedence over particulars, as in the case of killing with a heavy object, where deterrence is prioritised over the specific instrument used.”[7]

Imām al-Ḥaramayn, in his work Mughīth al-Khalq, provides numerous examples from various areas of fiqh demonstrating how Imām al-Shāfiʿī relied upon universal legal principles in each chapter, and how this led to derivative rulings consistent with those principles[8].

Among the examples he cites is the issue of zakāh:

“Al-Shāfiʿī said: The purpose of zakāh is to alleviate need, remove hunger, relieve poverty, show kindness to the poor, assist those in distress, preserve lives, and support those on the brink of hardship. Accordingly, it is appropriate that zakāh be discharged immediately and not deferred, nor nullified by death. For if we were to say that it may be delayed and that it lapses upon death, this would undermine its intended purpose. A person would continue to delay, incline towards ease, and succumb to negligence until it becomes a debt upon him; and if he dies, it would be nullified. This would lead to the nullification of zakāh and the loss of the Lawgiver’s intent, which is certainly invalid.”[9]

Another example concerns ḥajj:

“Al-Shāfiʿī said: Ḥajj is a great act of worship and a profound means of nearness to Allah, involving significant effort and hardship. It is the worship of a lifetime. Thus, it is appropriate that it be performed with allowance for delay. For if we were to say it is required immediately, it would necessitate that all people perform it in a single year, resulting in immense hardship and difficulty.”[10]

The researcher concludes that although Imām al-Shāfiʿī theoretically confined the sources of law to the Qur’an, Sunnah, ijmāʿ, and qiyās, in practical application, he did consider maṣlaḥah—provided it was rooted in an established Sharʿī principle (i.e., maṣlaḥah muʿtabarah).

Moreover, examining such recognised interests within the framework of uṣūl leads to the identification of the universal principles (kulliyyāt) upon which particular rulings are built. For this reason, scholars of the madhhab devoted considerable attention to studying these overarching legal principles, later articulated as maqāṣid al-sharīʿah.

The Development of Research and Writing on Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah Among the Khurāsānī Scholars

First: Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah in Works of Kalām and Philosophy

Among the earliest scholars to address maqāṣid al-sharīʿah were al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī (d. 320 AH), al-Qaffāl al-Shāshī (d. 365 AH), and Abū al-Ḥasan al-ʿĀmirī (d. 381 AH). Discussions on maqāṣid during this period were typically incorporated within works on the merits of Islam (maḥāsin al-Islām) and the deeper wisdoms of legislation (asrār al-tashrīʿ).

The primary aim of these writings was to highlight the underlying causes (ʿilal) and wisdoms (ḥikam) of Sharʿī rulings across various aspects of life. It appears that the intellectual focus of that time was largely directed towards responding to atheistic trends and certain Islamic sects—such as the Ẓāhiriyyah and Ismāʿīliyyah—who claimed that the inner meanings (bāṭin) of the Qur’an contradict its outward meanings (ẓāhir).

As for al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, he is mentioned by al-Subkī in Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfiʿiyyah al-Kubrā[11]. Among his notable works are:

al-Ṣalāh wa Maqāṣiduhā – in which he explores the objectives and inner meanings of prayer. His treatment follows the perspective of spiritual insight and taṣawwuf rather than that of jurists and uṣūl scholars. He is regarded as the first to explicitly employ the term maqāṣid.
al-Ḥajj wa Asrāruhu – where he explains the rituals of ḥajj from a juristic perspective while also highlighting their spiritual dimensions. This work is among his later writings.
Ithbāt al-ʿIlal – in which he discusses the underlying causes of Sharīʿah rulings and the purposes of acts of worship. In the introduction, al-Tirmidhī notes that some held the view that divine commands and prohibitions exist solely for submission and trial, without underlying causes. He therefore set out to demonstrate that these commands and prohibitions do possess inherent wisdom. He begins by addressing the overarching objective of the Sharīʿah—namely, the attainment of benefits and the prevention of harm—and then examines specific legal rulings across various chapters of fiqh, identifying their underlying causes. His work also contains references to the five essential objectives (al-maqāṣid al-ḍarūriyyah al-khams)[12].

As for al-Qaffāl al-Shāshī, he was among the leading Shāfiʿī authorities and counted among the aṣḥāb al-wujūh, and was also a prominent theologian who studied under Imām Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī. He authored Maḥāsin al-Sharīʿah, in which he examined the wisdoms and benefits underlying legal rulings. His work includes references to the five essential maqāṣid and was intended to persuade sincere seekers of truth by demonstrating the rational and ethical coherence of Sharīʿah rulings. In its introduction, he also refutes the Ismāʿīlī claim that prophecy and divine law are fundamentally flawed, employing a kalām-based argumentative style[13].

Abū al-Ḥasan al-ʿĀmirī, likewise mentioned by al-Subkī in Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfiʿiyyah al-Kubrā[14], was a distinguished philosopher. In his work al-Iʿlām bi-Manāqib al-Islām, he presents Islam as a comprehensive and coherent system. He briefly discusses the key wisdoms and benefits underlying Sharʿī rulings and addresses the concept of the five essential objectives, affirming that they are upheld across all revealed religions. He states:

“As for deterrent laws, their foundation, according to the adherents of the six religions, revolves around five principles: deterrence against taking life, such as retribution and blood-money; deterrence against unlawful appropriation of wealth, such as amputation and crucifixion; deterrence against violating honour, such as flogging and stoning; deterrence against slander, such as flogging along with legal discrediting; and deterrence against apostasy, such as execution.”[15]

From this, it becomes clear that during this stage, maqāṣid al-sharīʿah were not yet treated as an independent discipline. Rather, they were addressed within the broader contexts of kalām and philosophy—either to demonstrate the wisdom and beauty of Sharīʿah, as in the works of al-Qaffāl al-Shāshī; to defend Islam against atheistic critiques, as in the work of al-ʿĀmirī; or to respond to those who denied the presence of underlying causes in legal rulings, as in the writings of al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī.

Second: Maqāṣid in the Thought of Abū Zayd al-Dabbūsī

Abū Zayd al-Dabbūsī (d. 430 AH) made notable references to the concept of maqāṣid in his works Taqwīm al-Adillah and al-Asrār fī al-Uṣūl wa al-Furūʿ. He was among the earliest scholars to employ this concept within uṣūl al-fiqh, grounding it in what he termed compelling rational proofs (al-ḥujaj al-ʿaqliyyah al-mūjibah).

According to al-Dabbūsī, these rational imperatives can be categorised as follows:

Rational obligations concerning religion: These include recognising one’s servitude to Allah, affirming Allah’s divinity, acknowledging that human beings are tested through obedience to His commands and prohibitions until death for an appropriate recompense, and recognising that worldly life serves the benefit of those under trial.
Rational prohibitions concerning worldly life: These include actions such as frivolity, ignorance, foolishness, and injustice.
Rational prohibitions concerning religion: These include denial of the Creator, denial of resurrection, the claim that the world was created merely for the pursuit of desires, and belief in false deities (ṭāghūt)[16].
Rational permissions necessary for worldly survival: These include acts essential for sustaining life, such as breathing, eating, and drinking in the necessary measure; protecting oneself from harm; ensuring procreation through marital relations; and nurturing offspring until independence[17]. Al-Dabbūsī then states:

“We have said that these four rulings are rationally binding as part of one’s religious duty to Allah.”[18]

Rationally permissible actions related to worldly life beyond necessity: These include pursuing means of livelihood beyond immediate necessity, accumulating wealth beyond basic needs, and adornment with permissible forms of embellishment that are not essential for survival. He adds:

“Scholars have differed regarding the ruling of these categories based purely on reason. Our scholars hold that they are permissible unless there is evidence indicating prohibition.”[19]

The researcher observes that al-Dabbūsī’s contribution lies in articulating universal rational principles to which particular legal rulings revealed in the Sharīʿah may be referred. This approach is rooted in the Māturīdī doctrine of rational moral discernment (al-taḥsīn wa al-taqbīḥ al-ʿaqlī). Al-Dabbūsī states:

“It is established that reason, by itself, suffices as proof even without revelation, and acting upon it becomes necessary just as it is with revelation and other evidences once they are established.”[20]

Third: Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah in Works of Uṣūl al-Fiqh

Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī is regarded as the first to explicitly incorporate maqāṣid al-sharīʿah into works on uṣūl al-fiqh, particularly in discussions of legal causation (ʿillah). Building upon the Ashʿarī framework of taḥsīn wa taqbīḥ sharʿī, he categorised legal causes into five foundational principles:

That which has an intelligible meaning and relates to a necessity (ḍarūrah), which he termed al-kulliyyāt. He held that even a clear analogy may be set aside if it conflicts with a universal principle.
That which pertains to general need (ḥājah ʿāmmah).
That which reflects a purpose of attaining benefit or repelling its opposite.
Similar to the third, but involving departure from an established general analogy—such as a contractual arrangement between a slave and his master.
That in which no discernible meaning appears to the jurist, whether in terms of necessity, need, or moral refinement—such as purely devotional acts (ʿibādāt badanīyah).

Imām al-Ḥaramayn elaborated on these five principles and demonstrated how they function within the process of qiyās[21].

With regard to specific (partial) objectives, he mentioned some examples in al-Burhān and Mughīth al-Khalq, though without extensive elaboration. Thus, he may be regarded as the first to systematically integrate maqāṣid into both fiqh and uṣūl.

Al-Ghazālī further developed this framework by incorporating maqāṣid al-sharīʿah into his discussions of maṣlaḥah muʿtabarah (legally recognised interests) and appropriate legal causation (al-ʿillah al-munāsibah). He classified interests into three levels according to their strength:

Ḍarūriyyāt (essentials)
Ḥājiyyāt (needs)
Taḥsīniyyāt (refinements) — a term he himself introduced

He then identified the five essential objectives and placed them within the category of necessities, stating:

“The objective of the Sharīʿah with respect to creation is five: the preservation of their religion, life, intellect, lineage, and property. Whatever ensures the preservation of these five principles is a benefit, and whatever undermines them is harm, and its removal is a benefit. When we refer to a ‘suitable’ or ‘implied’ meaning in the chapter of analogy, we mean this category. These five principles are preserved at the level of necessities, which is the strongest level of interests.”[22]

Al-Ghazālī further emphasised that the preservation of these five essentials is established at the level of certainty (qaṭʿī), whereas matters beyond them may differ across legal systems. He states:

“The prohibition of undermining these five principles and the imposition of deterrents against them is inconceivable in any revealed religion intended for the rectification of humanity. Thus, all religious laws agree upon the prohibition of disbelief, killing, adultery, theft, and intoxication. As for what serves to complete or supplement this level, such as equivalence in retaliation or prohibiting small amounts of intoxicants due to their leading to greater harm, these are of a lesser degree, and thus differences may arise concerning them.”[23]

Subsequent uṣūl scholars adopted al-Ghazālī’s terminology and classifications of maqāṣid. As for partial objectives, they are extensively present in his Iḥyāʾ ʿUlūm al-Dīn, particularly within the sections on acts of worship and social dealings.

In conclusion, Imām al-Ḥaramayn and al-Ghazālī followed Imām al-Shāfiʿī in affirming maṣlaḥah muʿtabarah. They were also influenced by al-Dabbūsī’s effort to incorporate universal principles into uṣūl al-fiqh and to treat them at the level of certainty. However, they differed from him by grounding maqāṣid in Sharʿī universals rather than purely rational universals, in line with their adherence to the doctrine of taḥsīn wa taqbīḥ sharʿī. As al-Ghazālī states:

“Know that legal rulings derived from revelation are not attained through reason alone.”[24]

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing analysis, the study arrives at the following conclusions:

The intellectual environment in which the Khurāsānī school emerged had a profound impact, as reflected in the following:

Khurāsān was home to several major centres of learning. The ruling states actively supported scholarship by establishing schools and patronising scholars.
Intellectual activity in the rational sciences, particularly philosophy and kalam, flourished in Khurāsān. This led to the emergence of prominent philosophers and theologians, the production of significant works in these disciplines, and the widespread practice of scholarly debates among various schools and sects. This environment contributed to the development of ʿilm al-khilāf and juristic dialectics based on logical methods, and also supported the rise of the method of the mutakallimūn in uṣūl al-fiqh.
The coexistence of the mutakallimūn method in uṣūl al-fiqh alongside the Ḥanafī Samarqand school played a significant role in the emergence of maqāṣid al-sharīʿah. In particular, the works of Abū Zayd al-Dabbūsī influenced the writings of Imām al-Ḥaramayn and al-Ghazālī.
The Shāfiʿī madhhab flourished during the era of the Seljuk vizier Niẓām al-Mulk. The Niẓāmiyyah schools played a key role in advancing efforts to integrate the Iraqi and Khurāsānī Shāfiʿī traditions.

The scholarly methodology of the Khurāsānī school contributed significantly to the emergence of maqāṣid al-sharīʿah, as seen in the following:

The Khurāsānī school was characterised by extensive analytical inquiry, detailed juristic derivation, and refined organisation of legal material.
A number of jurists within the school attained the level of ijtihād within the madhhab (aṣḥāb al-wujūh). They developed a distinct methodological approach associated with their leading authority, al-Qaffāl al-Ṣaghīr, who was known for his expertise in takhrīj and tafrīʿ.
The method of the mutakallimūn in uṣūl al-fiqh became widespread during this period. It was characterised by abstract reasoning, independence from strict madhhab adherence, and a rational structuring of legal principles. This method played a crucial role in the development of maqāṣid al-sharīʿah.
The foundational principles of Imām al-Shāfiʿī’s madhhab had the greatest influence on the emergence of maqāṣid. The school’s acceptance of maṣlaḥah muʿtabarah led scholars to examine the underlying purposes of the Sharīʿah, resulting in the identification of universal legal principles (kulliyyāt) upon which specific rulings are based.
Early discussions on maqāṣid appeared within works of kalām and philosophy, often in the context of demonstrating the wisdom and coherence of Sharīʿah, or responding to critics of Islamic law. This is evident in the works of al-Qaffāl al-Shāshī, al-ʿĀmirī, and al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī.
Abū Zayd al-Dabbūsī was among the first to incorporate universal rational principles into uṣūl al-fiqh, linking particular rulings to broader rational foundations in accordance with the Māturīdī doctrine of rational moral discernment.
Imām al-Ḥaramayn was the first to integrate maqāṣid al-sharīʿah into uṣūl al-fiqh, particularly within the discussion of legal causation (ʿillah), based on the Ashʿarī framework of taḥsīn wa taqbīḥ sharʿī. He also contributed to the classification of maqāṣid into hierarchical levels.
Al-Ghazālī further systematised maqāṣid within the framework of maṣlaḥah muʿtabarah and appropriate legal causation. He classified interests into three levels—ḍarūriyyāt, ḥājiyyāt, and taḥsīniyyāt—introducing the latter term. He also explicitly identified the five essential objectives and established them as universally recognised necessities across all Sharīʿah systems.
Imām al-Ḥaramayn and al-Ghazālī followed Imām al-Shāfiʿī in affirming universal legal principles, while also drawing upon al-Dabbūsī’s incorporation of universals into uṣūl. However, they differed from him by grounding maqāṣid in Sharʿī universals rather than purely rational ones, in line with their adherence to the doctrine of taḥsīn wa taqbīḥ sharʿī.
The researcher recommends further study of rational universals and their application to particular rulings within the Samarqand Ḥanafī school, especially in the works of al-Dabbūsī.
The researcher also recommends further study of Sharʿī universals, their development, and their impact on juristic rulings within the Shāfiʿī tradition.

This research study was published in Arabic in Namāʾ Journal, Egypt, Vol. 9, Issue 2, June 2025 and reproduced by Jordan Dar al ifta on this link: https://www.aliftaa.jo/Research/273

The translation was verified and edited by Faisal Niyaz Hudawi

About the author:

Dr. Ḥamzah ʿAdnān Mashūqah, Directorate of Research and Studies / General Iftāʾ Department, Jordan

References:

[1] Al-Shāfiʿī, Muḥammad ibn Idrīs, al-Umm, Dār al-Fikr, Beirut, 1983, vol. 7, p. 280

[2] Al-Shāfiʿī, Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risālah, Maṭbaʿat Muṣṭafā al-Ḥalabī, Egypt, 1938, p. 505

[3] Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī, al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh, Dār al-Kutubī, 1998, vol. 8, p. 83

[4] Al-Juwaynī, Mughīth al-Khalq ilā Tarjīḥ al-Qawl al-Ḥaqq, al-Maṭbaʿah al-Miṣriyyah, 1934, p. 51

[5] Shihāb al-Dīn al-Zanjānī, Takhrīj al-Furūʿ ʿalā al-Uṣūl, Muʾassasat al-Risālah, Lebanon, 1398 AH, p. 320

[6] Abū al-Muẓaffar al-Samʿānī, Qawāṭiʿ al-Adillah, vol. 2, p. 259

[7] Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, al-Mankhūl min Taʿlīqāt al-Uṣūl, Dār al-Fikr al-Muʿāṣir, Lebanon, 1998, p. 576

[8] Al-Juwaynī, Mughīth al-Khalq, pp. 60–80